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WRONGFUL LIFE: THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY AND BEYOND
CAREL J. J. M. STOLKER*
I. A WRONGFUL LIFE
ON 24 February 1977 a severely handicapped girl was born in West Ger-
many. Her condition was due to a rubella (German measles) infection
caught by her mother in the first weeks of pregnancy. The gynaecologist
who had treated the mother was at fault in that he had not at the time
drawn the mother's attention to the illness and its dangers. If the woman
had been aware of the risks she would—and this was certain—have had an
abortion performed.
The doctor was faced with two claims for damages: one from the
mother, claiming the extra costs for bringing up a handicapped child, and
one from the child described on the basis of an American example äs a
"wrongful life" claim.1 The claim by the girl against the doctor was for
compensation of all damage she had suffered äs a result of the rubella
infection. The Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court) admitted the
mother's claim; however, it rejected the girl's. The significant consider-
ation in the judgment was "that in cases like the present the limits have
definitely been reached and overstepped within which a legal claim is
acceptable".2
Is it then true that here, in the case of the wrongful life claim, the limits
of liability law have been reached?3
* Carel Stoiker, University of Leiden, the Netherlands, has been a visiting professor of
law at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, during the 1991 spring
Semester. He is grateful to Academic Dean Mary Kay Kane, and to Professor David I.
Levine, both of Hastings, and to David Hansen, at that time third-year Student at Hastings,
for very helpful comments.
l. The father had also brought a claim, but for brevity's sake I will not deal with that. The
mother's claim, known äs the "wrongful birth" claim, is likewise disregarded here. For that
particular claim see e.g. C. R. Symmons, "Policy Factors in Actions for Wrongful Birth"
(1987) 50 M.L.R. 269 et seq.; Gerald Robertson, "Wrongful Life" (1982) 45 M.L.R. 697 et
seq.; Andrew Grubb, "Medical Law—Failure of Sterilisation—Damages for 'Wrongful Con-
ception' " (1985) 44 C.L.J. 30 et seq.; and Lexa Hilliard, " 'Wrongful Birth': Some Growing
Pains" (1985) 48 M.L.R. 224 et seq.; also, my dissertationAansprakelijkheid van de arts, in het
bijzonder voor mislukte sterilisaties ("Liability of the Doctor, Especially with Regard to
Unsuccessful Sterilisation") (1988; in Dutch, summaries in English, French and German).
2. Bundesgerichtshof 18 Jan. 1983, Juristenzeitung (1983), p.450: "dass in Fällen wie dem
vorliegenden überhaupt die Grenzen erreicht und überschritten sind, innerhalb derer eine
rechtliche Anspruchsregelung tragbar ist".
3. In the US that limit had already been reached earlier: Zepeda v. Zepeda 41111.App.2d
240,190 N.E.2d 849 (111.1963). The Claim is also referred to äs a "dissatisfied life claim".
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One year later, in England, a similar case was brought before the Court
of Appeal. Here, too, the plaintiff was born severely disabled. She claimed
compensation for negligence from the doctor and the health authority.
During pregnancy, her mother also had German measles. The infection,
though, was not diagnosed. Like the German court, the English Court of
Appeal ruled that a child has no nght of action for "wrongful life".4 Doc-
tors are not under a legal Obligation to the foetus to terminate its hfe nor
has a foetus a legal nght to die.' The Court's rejection of the claim was
predictable. McKay was decided under common law, but the same prm-
ciple would apply under the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liabüity) Act
1976, which was passed äs a result of the Law Commission's Report on
Injunes to Unborn Children.6 The Law Commission's intention was to pre-
clude an action for wrongful life. The question whether there should be a
claim for "wrongful life" was considered to be a difficult one "which has
caused us much concern". The Commission came to the conclusion that
no cause of action should lie:
Such a cause of action, if it existed, would place an almost intolerable bür-
den on medical advisers in their socially and morally exactmg role The dan-
ger that doctors would be under subconscious pressures to advise abortions
m doubtful cases through fear of an action for damages is, we think, a real
one It must not be forgotten that m certam circumstances, the parents
themselves might have a claim in negligence.
In the German case the Bundesgerichtshof ruled:
if such a claim by the child agamst the doctor is considered acceptable, then
one would for mstance also have to accept a habihty on the pari of parents
who, in spite of severely adverse genetic circumstances, have decided to
have a child (and thus burdened not only themselves but also others with
extra costs). All this makes it clear that the civil law has indeed reached its
hmits, so that a more far-reaching cause of action must be forgone A cause
of action in cases of this type is no longer feasible or meamngful.7
4 McKay v Euex Aren Health Authority [1982] Q B 1166, [1982] 2 W L R 890
5 Several comments have been wntten e g Charles Lewis, "The Quality of Life" (l 982)
L S Gaz 839, Robertson, op cit -supra n l, at pp 697 et seq , Symmons, op cit supra n l, at
pp 269 et !>eq
6 Report on Injunes to Unborn Children, Cmnd 5709 (1974) The Act, though, is a very
complex one it "has to be seen to be believed", according to Street on Torts (9th edn, Marga-
ret Bra/ier (Ed ), 1993), p 196 Under s l(2)(b), a cause of action accrues, tnter aha, if the
mother is affected dunng her pregnancy so that the child is born "with disabilities which
would not otherwise have been present" It is still unclear whether or not the Act also applies
to wrongful hfe Claims It is possible to argue that the issue of wrongful life with all its ethical
and moral implications remams open for review by the House of Lords Street, ibid See,
however, also Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (20th edn, R F V Heuston and
R A Buckley (Eds), 1992), p 430 "Such an action for'wrongful hte'did not exist before the
Act, and almost certamly does not exist now" (footnote omilted)
7 A good article on the "wrongful hfe cldim" is by the Belgien author R Kruithof,
"Schadevergoeding wegens de geboorte van een ongewenst kind7" (1986-1987) Rechts-
kundig Weekblad 2737 et seq (m Dutch)
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But, why is it that liability "in cases of this type is no longer feasible or
meaningful"? Surely, this cannot involve a new liability requirement
beyond the Standard hurdles of duty, breach, causation and damage. To
avoid liability, simply referring to possible future, completely different
cases must not be allowed to be the decisive argument in the debate before
the judge. The basic principles (dogmatics) of tort law ought to be adhered
to; in this and in any other type of case.8
Such a debate will, in the eyes of non-lawyers—m this case the victim
and the doctor—be conducted in an unpleasant "tone". The child's lawyer
will have to support his claim by postulating that it would have been better
if the girl had not been born. Obviously she is not mterested in the remedy
of the cost of suicide,9 but in the wish to live out the rest of her life without
cares, at least financially. But would it be enough for the girl's attorney to
ignore the dogmatics of tort law and plead solely for a socially acceptable
solution?10
On the other hand, the doctor's lawyer must be required to indicate that
one or more of the requirements for liability have not been fulfilled. Here,
too, it is not sufficient for him to appeal in abstract terms to "the limits of
liability law" by referring to other possible cases in the distant future. To
put it differently: the limits to liability law are not determined m the first
instance by the bounds of our Imagination or the bounds of our sense of
what is "reasonable" but by the boundary markers of duty, breach of duty,
causation and damage.11
8 Cf J H Nieuwenhuis, "Pleidooi voor een dogmatische rechtswetenschap" (1987)
R M Themis l (m Dutch)
9 Put m crude terms, the pnce of a bottle of pills
10 This is whal Schoordijk does in his article in a Festschrift for Rood-de Boer, Met het
oog op het belang van het kmd (1988), pp 129 et seq (in Dutch) See also the prehminary
recommendations of the Verenigmg voor Gezondheidsrecht by J K M Gevers, Juridische
Aspecten van erfelijkheidsonderzoek en advies (1987), pp 21 et seq (in Dutch) He (hke
other authors) is shghtly too optirmstic when he refers (idem, p 25) to a "growmg willmgness
of American judges" to find in favour of wrongful life Claims I can see no question of this m
the case law E g thecasethathequotes,/lzzo/irtov DmgfelderllN C App 289,322 S E 2d
567 (1984), has been quashed by the Supreme Court of North Carohna, 315 N C 103, 337
S E 2d 528 (1985) The claim was awarded m only a few cases Park v Chessm 60 A D 2d 80,
400 N Υ S 2d 110 (1977) (kidney disease), Becker v Schwanz 46 N Υ 2d 401,413 N Υ S 2d
895,386 N E 2d 807 (1978) (Down's syndrome), Turpm v Sorüm 31 Cal 3d 220,643 P 2d 954,
]82Cal Rptr 337 (1982) (deafness) The Supreme Court of California awarded compen-
sation only for certain matenal damages This lattcr rulmg set aside the much more generous
Curlender\erdict Curlenderv Bw-ScienceLaboratories 106Cal App 3d811,165 Cal Rptr
477 (1980) (Tay-Sachs disease) See also another Califorman case Nandini Gami v Mulhkm
Medical Center Daily Appcllate Rep , Sept 1993,11565 (iailure to disclose Information) (an
apphcation of the Turpm rule) This all looks shghtly different m the legal literature There
the claim is usually advocated
11 In the US, unlike the civil law countnes. there can be the additional comphcation of
"jury nullification" a jury ignonng its instructions and returmng a verdict agamst the law,
usually to soften the effect of what the Jurors regard äs an unfair legal doctnne See e g A
Scheflm and J Van Dyke, "Jury Nullification the Contours of a Controversy" (1980) 43(4)
Law & Contemp Probs 51
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An appeal—whether or not emotional—to the limits of liability law is
mainly heard in cases involving medical liability and then mainly from
health-care workers. In, say, traffic liability law—whose significance, at
least in Europe, within society is much bigger—such an appeal is heard
much less frequently. Why is this?
One reason may be that doctors do their work specifically with a view to
curing their patients. Unlike the normal Situation on the roads, therefore,
mistakes are not made by doctors working entirely in their own interest.
Another difference is that the parties to a medical claim usually know each
other beforehand; the doctor-patient relationship is regarded äs a prime
example of a relationship of trust. In the case of medical errors, a claim for
compensation by the patient severely disrupts that relationship of trust,
even more than the error itself. An additional factor is that the doctor
makes the error directly in the performance of his profession. Conse-
quently, it is quite understandable that he regards any claim äs a direct
attack on his professional honour.
Also of great importance in this context is the fear of "American-type
claims". Doctors are afraid that the Situation in the New World represents
their future, with its series of court actions, premium increases and
"defensive medicine".12 This, perhaps, is the reason for the appeal to the
limits of liability.
II THE WRONGFUL LIFE CLAIM
THE "wrongful life claim" category comprises numerous, highly difterent
types of cases. Invariably, however, they relate to the claim of the handi-
capped child. A few examples taken from American case law include a
careless medical treatment of the mother before conception;13 careless
genetic advice prior to14 or during pregnancy;15 careless Sterilisation of a
patient, specifically aimed at preventing the birth of a handicapped child;16
12 See e g Peter E Herzog, "The Reform of Medical Liability Tort Law or Insurance"
(1990) 38 A J Comp L 99 and my book about the American medical malpractice cnsis Van
arts naar advocaat—Aaruprakelijkheid voor medische foulen in Amerika (1989) (in Dutch)
13 E g Renslow v Mennomte Hospital 67 111 2d 348, 367 N E 2d 1250 (1977) (wrong
blood transfusion nine years before conception), Albala v City of New York 54 N Υ 2d 269,
445 N Υ S 2d 108,429 N E 2d 786 (1981) (perforated Uterus four years before conception)
14 E g Park v Chessin, supra n 10 (senous kidney disease), Moores v Lucas
Fla App 1981,405 So 2d 1022 (1981) (Larsen's syndrome) and Curlender, supra n 10 (Tay-
Sachs disease)
15 E g Procamc v Cülo 97 N J 339,478 A 2d 755 (1984) (rubelte), Berman v Allan 80
N J 421,404 A 2d 8 (1979) (Down's syndrome)
16 Eg Speckv Fmegold497Pa 77,439 A 2d 110 (1981) In this case a Sterilisation error
had been made first, then the abortion was unsuccessful and was followed by the birth of a
severely handicapped child (neurofibromatosis) And to think how students sometimes scoff
at the "improbable" cases set for prelimmary exams nothing is äs stränge äs reality'
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careless prescribing of medicines—whether or not of poor quality—dur-
ing pregnancy;17 and other careless actions during pregnancy.18
The wrongful life claim is regarded in America äs the frontier of medical
malpractice litigation. The principal reason it is becoming more and more
common is that the market for "genetic counselling" is rapidly growing.
While the West German case described earlier involved the failure to
identify rubella or the risks thereof (there have also been rubella Claims in
the United Kingdom and the United States), the majority of the American
verdicts relate to faults in genetic counselling.
Some wrongful life Claims are easier to assess than others. For instance,
a doctor who improperly administers medication to a pregnant woman,
injuring an otherwise healthy child before its birth, is directly liable to the
child.1<J The doctor is the one who caused the injury; similarly, a careless
driver of an automobile who collides with and injures a pregnant woman
also commits a tort towards her unborn child.
Assessment, however, becomes much more difficult in the rubella cases
and in the cases involving incorrect genetic counselling. Here, there is no
question of causing injury to a healthy child. However, the reproach that is
made to the doctor in such cases is that he has wrongly deprived the par-
ents of the possibility of abortion or, in the case of careless genetic coun-
selling prior to conception, that he has deprived the parents of the
possibility of deciding not to have children. These, the "much more diffi-
cult" cases, form the central focus of the present article.
III. A RIGHT TO BE ABORTED?
THE postulate put forward by the child-plaintiff is äs follows: "You, the
doctor, ought to have given my mother the opportunity of having me
aborted. My life is not worth living; I would prefer no life to the life I
have." It sounds like Job who, when tested by God äs a trial of strength
against the Devil, said: "Let the day perish wherein I was born... Let that
day be darkness."20
Earlier on, I pointed out that the child is not making a claim for "specific
performance" (i.e. death), but a claim for compensation of damages.
The liability law compels her to contest her own existence. The Bundes-
gerichtshof ruled that negligence had been committed äs against the
17. E.g. Grodin v. Grodin 102 Mich.App. 396,301 N.W.2d 869 (1980) (father and slightly
handicapped son (brown teeth) claim against mother and doctor for physical damage result-
ing frorn use of medicines during pregnancy).
18. E.g. Bergstreser v. Mitchell 577 F.2d 22 (1978) (carelessly performed Caesarean
section).
19. See e.g. Burton v. Islington Health Authority [1993] Q.B. 204, [1992] 3 All E.R. 833; de
Martell v. Merton and Sutton Health Authority [1992] 3 All E.R. 820.
20. Job 3: 3-4.
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mother and that she was entitled to damages, but that the Situation was
different for the child:21
A direct delictual Obligation to prevent the birth of a foetus on account of
the fact that the child will presumably be born with defects which, from the
point of view of society or from its own presumed view (äs to which there is,
by nature, not the slightest clue), would make its life seem "not worth liv-
ing", would by necessity constitute an alien element within the sphere of
delictual Standards of conduct which are generally focused on protecting the
integrity of human life. Such an Obligation does not exist.
Indeed, in the court's view, the mother can enter into an abortion agree-
ment with the doctor; but, in such an agreement, the child is no more than
a passive object. The child does not have a right to be aborted and thus
cannot impose upon the doctor any legal obligations.22
The Bundesgerichtshof further adds that a judge who allows the child's
claim will at the same time be giving a verdict on the value of the child's
life: "For you, it would have indeed been betler had you not been born."
The court, with an explicit reference to "the experience of the judge-made
law of the Federal Republic of Germany which has been tainted by the
National Socialist reign of injustice", feit abhorrence that such rulings
should ever have to be pronounced by judges.
The Dutch emeritus-professor Schoordijk pointed out that anyone who
objects to this judgment would seem to be casting a morally discreditable
light on himself. He argues, in line with contemporary social and ethical
views, that life is a valuable possession, but one that is not inviolable under
all circumstances. He therefore asks why the person who has to live with a
severe handicap because the doctor has not pointed out to the mother the
great risk of malformation and the alternative of having an abortion can-
not reproach the doctor by saying: "You have harmed me in my human
dignity. You negligenlly paid no heed to the fact that my mother—I could
not speak for myself, which is why my mother had to do this for me—did
not consider my life worth living; that is why you have violated my right, in
äs much äs this is humanly possible, to be born in reasonable health."23
The question is: did the doctor violate a legal Obligation towards the
girl? The Bundesgerichtshof answers this question in the negative. No act
of tort has been committed towards the child; neither a written nor an
unwritten legal Obligation exists that handicapped foetuses should be
aborted. Nor does a right to be aborted result for the child from the con-
tract between mother and doctor, "because the law currently in force
2l. Supra n.2, at p.450.
22. See also Stephenson LJ, in McKay [1982] 2 W.L.R. 890,902: "That duty rnay be owed
to the mother, but it cannot be owcd to the child."
23. Schoordijk, op. dt. supra n. 10, at p.132.
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grants the mother the justifiable permission to terminate a pregnancy
explicitly only where it is in her own interest".24
The right to request an abortion is vested solely in the mother, not in the
child. Schoordijk rightly questions why this is so. Is it not true, he writes,
that it is specifically the mother who is the person best qualified to assess
the child's chances in life in the child's interest äs she perceives it and to
draw conclusions from this in the child's interest—about which each per-
son may think differently but about which the mother is allowed to have
an opinion? He adds: "Is not the child allowed to join that opinion; is it not
imputed to the child?"25 Schoordijk goes no further than this, but he does
quote the German annotator Deutsch, who described the ruling of the
Bundesgerichtshof äs "a paternahstic limitation of the protective right to
the parents [which] seems strangely outmoded".26
Weir, in his comment on McKay, would appear to share Schoordijk's
opinion:27
In the present case "no duty" is perhaps the weakest of these grounds To
assert that one cannot owe a duty to a foetus to kill it is plausible enough, but
the plausibihty fades a bit when one has to admit that a duty to kill the foetus
may well be owed to the mother. if the duty can be owed to one of the affec-
ted parties, why not to the other?
The question now is: how can the child, to use Schoordijk's words, "join
that opinion"?28 No written or unwritten rule of law exists on the basis of
which the doctor should abort handicapped foetuses. That basis is seif-
evident. But in this case more is involved: a contract has been made
between the woman and the doctor. According to this contract the doctor,
at least impliedly, undertook to inform the woman, m the light of her preg-
nancy, about her illness (rubella) and about the risks it bore upon the
unborn child, who could be considered an intended beneficiary of the con-
tract. A comparable Situation exists in those cases in which the doctor has
provided the prospective parents with incorrect advice durmg genetic
counselling. Such advice is requested with a view to having children.29 The
request of the parents is not in the abstract form of "take a look at my
24 Supra n 2, at p 450, also dismissive were Stephenson and Ackner LJJ in the only UK
wrongful hfe case (rubella) McKay [1982] 2 W L R 890,900 etseq On this subject, see also
Robertson, loc at supra n l, Lewis, loc at supra n 5
25 Schoordijk, op cit supra n 10, at pp 133-134
26 E Deutsch, Jumtenzettung (1983), p 451 r c
27 Tony Weir, "Wrongful Life—Nipped m the Bud" (1982) 41 C L J 227
28 One rnight also thmk m terms of a third-party stipulation, or perhaps of an agreement
to which the äs yet unborn—perhaps not even conceived—child is a party via its mother
None the less, such constructions—which are somewhat artificial—are beyond everyday
reahty in cases hke this
29 Under Dutch law both a child m utero at the time the doctor provided neghgent advice
and a child conceived after the advice was provided would be considered intended benefici-
anes of the contract between doctor and parent
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genes", but is made with the Intention of preventing the birth of handi-
capped children.
This brings us to the topic of what the Dutch call the "requirement of
relativity",30 the Germans call "Schutznorm", and what in America and
England is usually referred to äs the "unforeseeable plaintiff". In a wrong-
ful life case, there is a duty: in this case not an unwritten duty or a statutory
one—äs usually applies in the case of relativity—but a contractual duty.31
That duty must be allocated a certain protective scope. The law "does not
recognise a duty in the air", äs the English Lord Justice Greer once said.32
The requirement of "relativity" is firmly established in the New Dutch
Civil Code: "There is no Obligation to repair damage when the violated
duty does not have äs its purpose the protection from damage such äs that
suffered by the victim."33 So, not only must it be ascertained which
elements of damage are covered by its protection but also who falls within
the scope of its protection. To put it in English terms, whether the victim is
a "foreseeable plaintiff".34 To whom does the doctor owe a duty of care?
Obviously, it is owed to the mother, but does it also include the child? Is
there also a duty owed to the childl
The contract the woman made with the doctor, besides being in her own
self-interest, also included the interests of the child, however counter-
30. The Dutch word "relativiteit" refers to the relationship between the tortfeasor and the
victim. There is a very interesting parallel concept in American tort law: see Cardozo CJ in
Palsgrafv. Lang Island Railroad Co. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), who wrote: "The
conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the package, was
not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, Standing far away. Relatively to her it was not
negligence at all."
31. The doctrine of relativity normally occurs in cases of tort. Yet it sometimes also has a
bearing in cases of contractual liability. Compare my dissertation, op. dt. supra n.l, at pp.60
et seq. and the dissertation by G. H. Lankhorst, De relativiteit van de onrechtmatige daad
(1992; in Dutch, with sumniaries in English and German). See also Kruithof, op. dt. supra
n.7, at p.2750.
32. Greer LJ in Bottemley v. Bannister [1932] l K.B. 476.
33. Para.6:163; the new code came into force on l Jan. 1992. Recently a translation in bolh
English and French was published: P. P. C. Haanappel and Ejan Mackaay, New Netherlands
Civil Code—Patrimoniallaw/Nouveau Code Civil Neerlandais—leDroitPatrimoinal(199Q).
34. See the important US case, Palsgraf, supra n.30, "a law professor's dream of an exam-
ination question": Prosser and Keeton on Torts (1984), p.285; see also, more elaborate, the
discussion of the US view in Prosser, "Palsgraf Revisited" (1953) 52 Mich.L.Rev. l, 3. In
England Lord Atkin has had a tremendous influence on the topic of duty of care towards the
plaintiff. He introduced what now is called the "Atkinian neighbour principle": "The rule
thal you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and
the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take
reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely
to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be—
persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have
them in contemplation äs being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omis-
sions which are called in question": Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562,580. The words
"unforeseeable plaintiff" do not seem completely appropriate, since they focus entirely on
the person of the victim, whereas the words "relativiteit" and '•''Schutznorm" focus both on
the person of the victim and the type of damages suffered by that victim.
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intuitive some people may consider this "protection of interests" to be.
Therefore the protective scope of the duty is also extended to the unborn
child. In respect of that child, a duty (i.e. a contractual duty) was violated
äs well.35
Support for this idea can be found in the Dutch "stowaway" case, which
is a very clear and beautiful example of the usefulness of a separate
requirement for liability besides duty, breach and causation. Van den
Akker went off the road in his delivery truck at a bend, the truck toppled
over and came to rest against a tree. In the back of the truck, unbeknown
to the driver, had been Jansen; Jansen had been flung out of the truck and
was lying severely injured on the verge. The question was whether Van
den Akker had now also committed an act of tort äs against Jansen. In its
ruling, applying to the doctrine of "relativity", the Dutch Supreme Court
set out the following considerations: "that Van den Akker did not need to
be mindf ul of the presence of people in the loading space of his vehicle and
therefore also did not need to make allowance in his driving behaviour for
any risks resulting therefrom for the well-being of such people".36
Regarding the question of whether Van den Akker's negligent driving
behaviour was also an act of tort towards the stowaway, the Supreme
Court held that the decisive factor was whether the perpetrator should
have made allowance in his behaviour for the attendant danger and for the
well-being of the stowaway. He will certainly have to make allowance for
other road users, but not for a stowaway since the driver did not need to
"be mindful" of him.
There is no reason that this criterion cannot also be applied in contrac-
tual wrongful life cases. The doctor also violates a legal Obligation towards
the child if he should have been mindful of its presence and of its interest
äs this is perceived by the mother. This may be the case because the
mother has specifically consulted the doctor with a view to having chil-
dren. But it may also be the case where he should have informed the
mother of his own accord—for instance, in rubella cases.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF THE DAMAGE
IF we now assume that the doctor is liable towards the child, the next
question that arises is: what damage does the child suffer? At a first glance
the answer to this question seems simple: all the damage that results from
the handicap—in other words, medical costs, adaptation of the home, loss
35. As far äs US law is concerned, this contractual duty obviously does not come from a
bargain or arrangement, but should be implied in law. I am arguing for an expansion of
traditional concepts. In the US, by analogy, contract limitations have been avoided and new
theories of recovery developed in situations in which the contract is between parties having a
special relationship (i.e. insurance). Similarly, the relationship here between mother, child
and doctor deserves special treatment.
36. Hoge Raad 27 Jan. 1984, (1984) Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 536.
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of earnings, etc. Here, the present handicapped Situation is compared with
that of a healthy child in the same way that two situations are normally
compared in order to assess the daniage. There must always be some
change for the worse, a "diminution". The "fixed comparison point" in all
cases is the Situation in which the duty has not been violated.
Upon closer examination, however, we come up against an unusual
problem. Without a violation of the duty (e.g. correct Information about
the rubella disease, or correct genetic counselling), the child would not
have existed. Even if a healthy child would have been born, it would have
been a different child (i.e. because the parents had decided, after abortion
of the "handicapped foetus", to have a second—and perhaps this time
healthy—child).37 But the handicapped girl who is the focus of this article
would never have been born healthy. The cause of the handicap was not
the doctor, but the rubella infection. The only reproach against the doctor
is that the child was born with handicaps.
Here, there are two closely interrelated problems. The first is whether
the judge, in using the "diminution" qualification äs an element of dam-
age, is making a value judgment on the life of a handicapped person äs
such. Many American judges who have studied the wrongful life claim
seem to have had great difficulty with this question. In fact, is the judge not
being forced to make the Statement that the child's life has indeed become
of less value or inferior? To quote a Jewish proverb, "Is not the worst life
always better than the best death?"38 However, such a court decision
seems in no way to imply any judgment on the value of human life äs such.
In the case of the wrongful life claim what is involved is living with handi-
caps. If the courts do permit the action, juries and the expert witnesses will
have to give an opinion on this. In injury cases they do nothing eise. In so
many cases an opinion is given on the diminution of the material and non-
material conditions of the severely handicapped victims, both physically
and emotionally, but that did not mean that anything was said about a
diminution of the value ofthat life. This is not altered by the fact that in the
wrongful life claim the child is forced by the rules of the game to compare
its handicapped existence with non-existence.
37. Those interested in this problem should refer to D. Parfitt, Reasons and Persons
(1984), chap.3.
38. E.g. in Gleitman v. Cosgrove 49 N.J. 22,227 A.2d 689 (1967)—the claim was rejected—
the considerations were that it "is basic to the human condition to seek life and hold on to it
however heavily burdened"; followed by a quotation from Theocritus: "For the living there
is hope, but for the dead there is none." More details on this can be found in an article—
interesting in its own right—by the Americans J. Bopp, B. A. Bostrom and D. A. Mckinney,
"The 'Rights' and'Wrongs' of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life: A Jurisprudential Analy-
sis of Birth Related Torts" (1989) 27 Duq.L.Rev. 461 et seq. In my opinion, however, the
question is no longer of importance in assessing the damage. It has already been answered by
the mother (see Part III).
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The second problem is much greater. Even assuming that we can speak
of a "diminution" äs an element of damage, we still have to ascertain the
extent of that damage. To assess the damages, a comparison has to be
made between handicapped life and non-life. For the child in fact had only
one alternative to its handicapped life: non-existence. It should be borne
in mind that the child was damaged not by the doctor but by rubella. What
the doctor can be blamed for is that the child was born handicapped. What
should not be allowed is a comparison between handicapped life and
healthy life. That latter alternative has never existed for the child.
But how can non-life or non-existence be assessed? What is the "fixed
comparison point" in this Situation? The problem is that the child has no
solid ground under its feet—in the same way äs Baron von Münchhausen,
who feil into the swamp while riding his horse. It is true that the Baron was
able to pull himself out of the swamp by his wig; for that, he merits our
eternal admiration. The girl, however, is not Baron von Münchhausen.
Does this mean that the girl's claim should therefore be rejected?
On the other hand one may ask oneself whether this problem—that the
damage cannot be assessed—is not an all too formalistic argument to send
the girl home with. She experiences her suffering day in and day out; if the
doctor had not made a mistake, she would never have suffered. Yet she is
told that her claim is built on quicksand. "If my grief were thoroughly
weighed and my calamity laid in the balances," we hear Job lamenting
again, "it would be heavier than the sand of the sea." And still no compen-
sation? Is there no way out of this?
The UK Law Commission also questioned whether, in rejecting the
wrongfui life claim, it was not attaching too much weight to "consider-
ations of logic": "Law is an artefact and, if social justice requires that there
should be a remedy given for a wrong, then logic should not stand in the
way."39
Erwin Deutsch, a famous German annotator, too, does not seem to be
impressed by the power of logic. He strongly condemns the Alles-oder-
Nichts Prinzip (all-or-nothing principle) applied by the Bundesgerichts-
hof.40 Deutsch advocates that the child should not be compensated for all
costs of living but only for those costs which result from the handicap (the
additional needs: Mehrbedarf). The central idea in his argument is that the
law would be falling short if it could not come up with a solution. But,
however sympathetic the aim may be—and whose sympathy does not lie
with the child?—the damage problem does not seem to have been solved
39. Law Commission, op. dt supra n.6, at p.34. Ultimately, the Commission rejects the
claim after all, fearing an increasing number of abortions (see under Part V infra).
40. In my opinion Deutsch is here confusing "Haftungsgrund" and "Haftungsumfang",
although he himself denies this.
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but, rather, pushed aside. Whichever way we look at it, Deutsch is compar-
ing a handicapped life with a healthy life.
In American case law, totally different results have been reached. Only
a few judges, almost always in the lower courts, have ruled in favour of the
child. In the great majority of the cases, the court rejected the child's
claim. Sometimes because, in the opinion of the judge, there was no quest-
ion of a "legally cognisable wrong" (however, see under Part III, above);
sometimes—äs already discussed—because a favourable verdict for the
child might be seen äs a disqualification of handicapped life; and lastly—
and this is the question now being dealt with—because a comparison
between a handicapped existence and a healthy existence is not possible.
How can we say anything about "non-existence", "the utter void of non-
existence"?41 Similarly, how can we say anything about whether non-exist-
ence is "better" than a handicapped existence, or whether the worst life is
better than the best death?
In numerous American verdicts it is emphasised that much more is
involved than the difficulties of assessing the damage; the "imprecision of
damages" is said to be an insufficient reason for rejecting the child's
claim.42 However, the problem here is literally of a fundamental nature: it
affects the very foundations of our concept of damage. It is understan-
dable that a judge, confronted with the injured child, is tempted to pay less
heed to the foundations of our liability law. And yet it would seem more
courageous to stand firm and reject the claim (but it is easy to be cour-
ageous when not in the front line). For judges working in those countries
with a strong System of social programmes, it is easier to stand firm know-
ing that the child will have appropriate medical and educational assistance
without bankrupting the parents.
Nonetheless, my conclusion is that the children in wrongful life claims
of this type have no right to compensation. Not because the child does not
suffer any damage, but because of the lack of the comparison point
needed to ascertain the compensation: whichever way you look at it, the
child would never have had a healthy life. Under liability law, this child
who has been born handicapped should be treated no differently from
handicapped people who cannot point to a mistake made by a third party.
It is a societal decision of how much to assist all handicapped people. The
rnistake in itself is insufficient to allow one class of the handicapped to
claim special compensation. This applies both to the rubella cases and to
those in which careless genetic counselling was given before or during
pregnancy. Both types of cases have one thing in common: non-existence
4l. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, supra n.38 (rubella), the first wrongful life claim. It was rejected
and the verdict was to play an important role in numerous other cases in which the claim was
rejected (e.g. in McKay, supra n.4).
42. E.g. Turpin v. Sortini, supra n. 10.
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was the only alternative for the child. The child—äs it now Stands before
the judge—could never have been "healthy".43 On the other hand, if it
would have been possible on the basis of careful medical treatment for the
child's handicap to have been alleviated, there is a much stronger case for
compensation. Incidentally, that future seems to be moving ever closer
now that more and more possibilities are opening up in the area of, say,
genetic manipulation. But for now, this is not possible: the claim must be
rejected.44
V. OTHER GROUNDS FOR REJECTION
ANYONE who peruses the case law and literature, in Europe and in the
United States, on the wrongful life claim will notice that other arguments
are also used to reject the child's claim. A number of US judges, for exam-
ple, have ruled that the child's claim is against public policy. That ruling
usually stems from the conviction that it is "unseeming" for someone to
throw his or her existence open to public discussion. Nevertheless such
(and also other) cases involve a normal claim for compensation, albeit one
that is based on exceptional circumstances.
The rejection of the claim may also result from a certain—frequently
unexpressed—fear of ethical questions. Such a fear, it is said, would cause
a court of law to choose a simpler route, since the court normally has to
reach an opinion in a brief space of time äs compared to the years available
to State commissions and politicians. In the New York case of Becker v.
Schwanz, for example, one of the judges considered the wrongful life
problem to be a "mystery more properly to be left to the philosophers and
the theologians".45 Although Dias and Markesinis do refer to the ethical
dimension attaching to some medical liability cases äs a "God-sent gift"
for the lawyer—"it gives his topic an added dimension which other, more
black-letter topics simply do not have"—that is surely more likely to be
the experience of the researcher rather than of the judge working under
great pressure of time.46
Another argument raised against the wrongful life claim, inter alia by
the Law Commission and by the UK Pearson Commission, was the danger
of an increasing number of abortions.47 It was thought that, because of a
43. See Weir, op. dt. supra n.27, at pp.227 et seq.
44. I realise that this may seem harsh. And harsh it must also have been in so many other
cases where not all the requirements for liability were met, äs e.g. (in a completely different
case) Barnett v. Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Commlttee [1968] 2 W.L.R.
422. The argument that in this way a doctor "gets off scot free" and that this is undesirable
does not appeal to me. The "punitive" function, which liability law scarcely possesses any-
way, should be found in such a case in Professional disciplinary sanctions.
45. Becker v. Schwartz, supra n.10.
46. R. W. M. Dias and B. S. Markesinis, Tort Law (1989), p.m.
47. Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury, Report,
Vol.l (1978), Cmnd 7054-1 No.1485.
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fear of being held liable, doctors might bring pressure to bear on pregnant
women to have an abortion performed if there was the slightest chance
that something might be "wrong" with the child. This argument is difficult
to follow: most wrongful life Claims involve doctors who made mistakes in
the information they provided to the woman. If they made no mistakes,
they have nothing to fear: the choice whether or not to have an abortion is
in fact that of the woman—provided she stays within the limits of the law.
A fear of some pressure being brought to bear on the woman is realistic
only if mistakes have been made at an earlier stage. But, even in such a
case, this argument is still too weak to constitute a reason to reject a
wrongful life claim. If the argument was founded, surely this should rather
be a task for the legislaturel
The same applies to the fear that Claims by children against doctors will
be followed by Claims by children against their parents. One of the first—
and most famous—cases was that oiZepeda v. Zepeda.4* A child brought a
claim for compensation against his father for having fathered him after
making false and unfulfilled promises of marriage to his mother. The child
now had to go through life äs a "bastard" which, he said, caused him suf-
fering. The Supreme Court of Illinois decided that it was indeed an act of
tort on the part of the father; the Court was so afraid of opening the flood-
gates to subsequent claims, however, that it rejected the claim. Other ex-
amples can easily be given: mothers who smoke or drink, pregnant women
who endanger the unborn child through, say, reckless driving, and par-
ents—the Bundesgerichtshof specifically mentions them—who opt for a
pregnancy despite a not insubstantial risk of a handicapped child being
born.49 Should cases like this now be an argument for rejecting the child's
claim in a completely different case? I think not. They are cases which
should be judged on their own merits and in which, above all, the question
to be examined is whether or not there has been a violation of the duty äs
against the child. If there is a fear of the law being abused, then surely this,
too, is a task for the legislature.50
48 Zepeda v Zepeda, supra n 3 In the US hterature this case is sometimes descnbed äs
"interfamihal warfare", sec Bopp, Bostrom and Mckmney, op cit supra n 38, at p 511
49 One reason for rejecting these Claims may be practical, the claim is not rcally against
the parent, but against the insurer
50 Just like the UK legislature with the Congemtal Disabihties (Civil Liabihty) Act 1976,
chap 28 (see supra n 6), and the legislalures m many States m the US. In California e g a
wrongful life Statute was enacted m response to language in Curlender, ̂upra n 10, which
suggested the possibihty of wrongful life suits by senously impaired children against their
parents "No cause of action anses against a parent of a child based upon the claim that the
child should not have been conceived or, if conceived, should not have been allowed to have
been born ahve" Cal Qv Code, para 43 6(a) (West, 1981) A more recent development in
the US is the "Fremd Amendment", mtroduced by Congressman Steven Fremd (42 Pa
Cons Stat Ann , paras 8305-8306 (Purdon Supp , 1989)) The law is discussed by J Lyons,
"To Be or Not to Be. The Pennsylvania General Assembly Ehmmates Wrongful Birth and
Life Actions" (1989) 34 Vill L Rev 681 et>>eq
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Lastly—and this applies specifically to the United States—one iniport-
ant argument for rejecting the claim is found in attempts to contain the
medical liability crisis. This argument plays a role mainly for the legis-
lature. In numerous States legislation has been introduced banning the
wrongful life claim. The arguments for this legislation are partly of "a
higher order",51 but express reference is also made to the insurance crisis.
One example is the Freind Amendment in the State of Pennsylvania.52
VI. CONCLUSION
LET me now return to the beginning of the article. The Bundesgerichtshof
took the view that, by allowing the girl's claim, limits within which the
liability law ought to remain would be overstepped. It would not be sur-
prising if lawyers in many other countries feit the same. This article advo-
cates a careful approach to those limits to liability. Appealing to them is
dangerous in that it carries an inherent Suggestion that this is the natural
course of things; for, in fact, limits are usually cognisable and clearly
marked. In wrongful life cases this will often only appear to be so: the
Bundesgerichtshofs belief that it could identify a limit differs completely
from the view taken by numerous individual US judges and numerous
authors. The limit will be drawn by everyone in a different place—cer-
tainly where matters having an ethical impact are concerned. In this way
everyone can do äs the Romans did and make sacrifices to his own Ter-
minus, his own god of boundaries.
If this is true, and if such a boundary represents no more than a fragile
fa9ade for a highly personal viewpoint, appealing to it serves no purpose.
In the same way äs between neighbours, boundaries make sense only if
they are accepted by more than one person. And is it necessary? Within
liability law we already have one clear boundary marker, and that is the
requirement of breach of the Standard of care: the default, the act of tort.
Confining myself for the moment to medical liability, by carefully laying
down the duty, by setting no unrealistic requirements for professional
practice by doctors, a much more important contribution will be made to
keeping the liability "tragbar" (acceptable) than by rejecting or legally
prohibiting one comparatively arbitrary type of claim.
I have also argued in this article in favour of a careful handling of the
dogmatics of liability law. As an incisive example I chose the dilemma of
the wrongful life claim. My conclusion is that the claim by the child must
be rejected. Not because no legal Obligation has been infringed äs against
51. E.g. that it is considered undesirable if parents who (say that they) will opt for an
abortion are entitled to compensation, whereas parents who make a "pro-lifc" choice would
have no such entitlement. Sorne people think that this distinction cannot be justified. In the
Freind Amendment, ibid, this is one of the explicit arguments for banning the wrongful life
claim.
52. See supra n.50.
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the child; it has been infringed. However, what does stand in the way of
liability is the fact that there is a lack of the comparison point required for
assessing the compensation of damage. For the child there is only one
alternative: non-existence. Although this seems unsympathetic to the
child, the choice for or against compensation of damage is at the same time
a choice for or against the dogmatics of liability law. By choosing the dog-
matics of liability law I have chosen against the child. However, over time
the dogmatics have served us well. When a plaintiff has proved all of the
required elements, a court's duty is to find the defendant liable. The court
is then imposing what we generally deem to be a tolerable bürden on the
defendant. To subtract judicially an element from the plaintiff's case
would impose an intolerable bürden on defendants. On the other hand,
judicially rejecting a claim that under the traditional dogmatics is legally
sufficient imposes an intolerable bürden on plaintiffs. In the case of
wrongful life, the claim does not fail because "acceptable limits" have
been reached. More simply, it fails because the plaintiff is unable to prove
all of the traditional elements. If the traditional balance is to be altered in
favour of either plaintiffs or defendants, it is up to the legislature to make
that change.
